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Abstract
Since the first national antidumping law was established in Canada in 1904, 
antidumping policy has evolved constantly as a legal trade restriction under General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) provisions. This paper studies the determinants 
of antidumping filings by U.S. industries from 1980 to 1995 using panel count regression 
analysis. The paper also investigates factors that influence the International Trade 
Commission’s (ITC) injury determinations over these cases. Considerable support is 
found for the importance of the business cycle in driving antidumping filings and 
affecting the ITC’s injury determinations. Other important determinants include 
industries’ capacity utilization ratio, industrial trade deficit, amendments to the 
antidumping law, country dummies, and so forth.
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11. Introduction
Since the first national antidumping law was established in Canada in 1904, 
antidumping policy has coexisted with and has been endorsed by the international trade 
system. In fact, it has evolved constantly as a legal trade restriction under General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) provisions. A number of major trading nations 
followed Canada and adopted this “innocent” solution to offset the adverse effects of 
foreign rivals’ dumping activities on the domestic economy. Such intention is 
documented in W. S. Fielding’s (Canadian Minister of Finance, 1904) proposal for the 
antidumping regulation:
“ .. .We find today that the high tariff countries have adopted that method of trade 
which has now come to be known as slaughtering, or perhaps the word more frequently 
used is dumping; that is to say, that the trust or combine, having obtained command and 
control of its own market and finding that it will have a surplus of goods, sets out to 
obtain command of neighboring market will put aside all reasonable considerations with 
regard to the cost or fair price of the good; the only principle recognized is that the goods 
must be sold and the market obtained...This dumping then, is an evil and we propose to 
deal with it.. .Whenever it appears to the satisfaction of the minister of customs.. .that the 
export price...is less than the fair market value thereof, as determined according to the 
basis of value for duty provided in the Customs Act...such articles shall, in addition to 
the duty otherwise established, be subject to a special duty of customs equal to the 
difference between fair market value and such selling price.’’(United States Tariff 
Commission, 1919, p.2)
In spite of being created-as an ad hoc solution to protect domestic industries from 
injuries caused by imports sold at “less than fair value” (LTFV), the use of antidumping 
protection has proliferated over the past two decades. For example, all GATT member 
countries filed only about 10 antidumping petitions in the 1960s, while more than 1600 
antidumping cases were filed during the 1980s. In the 1990s, about 2200 cases were filed.
2Another noteworthy observation is that 29 countries had initiated antidumping petitions 
by the end of the 1990s, while only five countries, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the 
United States and the European Community (EC), participated actively in the 
antidumping club in the 1980s (Prusa, 1999). The rapid expansion of the antidumping 
club and the surge in the number of alleged antidumping cases have raised fears that 
antidumping has been used far beyond its initial intention stated in the Canadian 
antidumping statute. Of all the issues negotiated under the Uruguay Round, antidumping 
was perhaps the most contentious. For instance, while in the Uruguay Round the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) restricted the use of voluntary export restraints (VER), it 
articulated the validity of the VER-like characteristics of antidumping. That is 
antidumping investigation proceedings may be suspended or terminated without 
antidumping duties when exporters voluntarily restrict trade or increase prices (Hindley 
and Messerlin, 1996). The decrease of the VER application and the increase of 
antidumping regulation make it reasonable to wonder whether antidumping law is simply 
another manifestation of trade protectionism—a substitute for tariffs. In a sense, 
“Antidumping is a threat to the liberal trading system that post-World War II Western 
leadership struggled courageously and effectively to create. It offers a GATT-legal mean 
to destroy the GATT system.” (Mastel, 1998, p.4)
This paper’s primary goal is to share insights into U.S. antidumping application, 
intending to answer the question what the determinants of industries’ filing decisions are 
as well as whether cases are judged strictly based on economic criteria articulated in the 
statute.
3To estimate the industries’ filing behavior, we study antidumping petitions by 
U.S. industries from 1980 to 1995, using panel data at the 4-digit Standard Industrial 
Code (SIC) level. Takacs (1981) and Finger (1981) provide a framework for estimating 
the demand for trade protection against the LTFV cases. Their findings show that the 
slowdown in both general and industry-specific economic activities, such as production 
and export, increases protectionist pressures.1 Some recent empirical studies (i.e., Hansen 
and Prusa, 1997 and Leidy, 1997) find similar results, while Sabry (2000) argues that the 
likelihood of antidumping filings is an increasing function of the industrial capacity 
utilization ratio in cases of low-concentrated industries. A common theme in these studies 
is the impact o f macroeconomic variables such as GNP level and real exchange rates. 
Interestingly, these studies come up with substantially different findings. Feinberg 
(1989), for example, finds that, for years between 1982 and 1987, the depreciation of the 
US dollar was significantly associated a higher incidence of antidumping petitions. 
Knetter and Prusa (2000), however, find overwhelming evidence that dollar appreciation 
would lead to an increase in antidumping petitions. They argue that US dollar 
depreciation decreases the import penetration ratio, making injury determination less 
likely and, thus, domestic industries would be less likely to file. To provide a clearer 
picture of how macroeconomic pressures affect the incidence of filing, this study is 
distinguished from previous works in using the business cycle as a proxy for general 
economic pressures. The detailed definition and the advantages of such a measurement
1 Protectionist pressure is defined as the number of petitions for protection filed in a 
given year.
4are specified in section 4. The impacts of other economic and non-economic factors on 
industries’ filing decisions are also explored.
Our second objective is to estimate the determinants of the International Trade 
Commission’s (ITC) material injury determinations, which allows for a two-sided 
(demand and supply) analysis of U.S. antidumping experience. In other words, by 
comparing the determinants o f industries’ filing decisions and those of the ITC’s 
decisions, we analyze whether domestic industries strategically file antidumping cases 
based on anticipated outcomes of the ITC’s decision, and whether the ITC is subject to 
the petitioners’ pressure in demanding antidumping protections. According to U.S. 
antidumping law, the International Trade Administration (ITA) and the International 
Trade Commission are the agencies responsible for independent antidumping 
investigations. Since the criteria for LTFV test are often constructed in favor of domestic 
petitioners, the ITA was estimated to have rejected only five percent of the petitions filed 
during 1980-1988 (Hansen and Prusa, 1997). Because the ITC is the authority that makes 
the final determination on material injury investigation, it plays a crucial role in the 
administrative procedures of U.S. antidumping law. Therefore, we will focus on the 
determinants of the ITC’s final injury decisions. A probit model is applied to model the 
ITC’s decision-making behavior.
In theory, the use of administered trade protection granted by these agencies 
should be purely a function of the rules stipulated in the relevant trade laws. Therefore, if 
the ITC is an independent administrative agency, it should grant antidumping protection 
only when the case-specified economic data satisfy the material injury criteria. Therefore,
5external pressures should not influence the ITC’s final decisions (Hansen and Prusa, 
1997). In other words, the ITC should be directed by the antidumping statue to consider 
only the industry-level economic measurements in determining material injury. Among 
these statutory requirements are evidences of deterioration of domestic sales, capacity 
utilization, employment, profits, etc. (Tharakan, 1991). Thus, one would expect the 
estimation of such economic hardship experienced by the complaining industry to have 
been the only factor swaying the ITC’s decisions. In practice, however, there are 
considerable questions about whether the procedure is impartial as is implied in the 
antidumping statute. A number of studies have modeled the ITC’s decision-making 
procedure, in different approaches, weighting the impacts of various factors in predicting 
the investigation outcomes. J. Michael Finger is among the tireless critics of antidumping 
legislation. Finger et al. (1982) pioneer the efforts to question the apolitical nature of the 
ITC’s decision-making processes. They find that for antidumping and countervailing duty 
cases filed between 1975 and 1979, political pressures, as measured by industry size and 
industrial concentration, exert statistically significant impacts on the outcomes of the 
ITC’s injury determinations. Ensuing studies, however, raised considerable doubts on the 
importance of political pressure in the ITC’s decisions. For example, Baldwin (1985) and 
Anderson (1993) argue that the ITC is most likely to make decisions based on a strict 
interpretation of the law, while Moore (1992) suggests that the ITC had been an 
imperfect barrier between vote-seeking politicians and protection-seeking interests.
An extensive list is provided in section 3.1.
In light of the capture theory of regulation, regulations are to serve producer interest by 
raising prices and reducing the number of competitors (William, 1972).
6With the debate on the political influence continues, more recent studies have 
begun to look at the impacts of macroeconomic conditions on the outcomes of the ITC’s 
injury investigation. Figure 1 provides a clear picture of the cyclical nature of the ITC’s 
material injury decision making. It shows that since the economic contraction starting in 
the second half of 1981, the level o f affirmative determination, as a percent of the total 
number of annual cases, had been rising and almost hit 90 percent in 1982. During the 8- 
year economic expansion starting in late 1982, however, the ratio of affirmative decision 
is around 70 percent. The rate increased to about 90 percent again when economy 
contracted in 1990. The observed cyclical behavior of the ITC’s injury decisions over 
time may imply the ITC’s vulnerability to general economic pressures.
Figure 1.
The Ratio of Affirmative ITC Final Material Injury Decision 1980-1996
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An alternative explanation for such cyclical behavior is provided in Baldwin and 
Steagall (1994) emphasizing the Congresses’ budgetary power. “In view of the frequent 
statements by many members of Congress that the ITC should be more willing to provide
7protection against injurious imports and the well known readiness of Congress to use its 
budgetary power to influence behavior in the government, one would expect some 
collective pressure on commissioners to accommodate these congressional wishes in 
order to obtain the funding desired.” (Baldwin and Steagall, 1994 p.293) Based on such a 
notion, it is reasonable to expect that the ITC is more willing to grant affirmative injury 
findings during economic downturns to meet the Congresses’ protectionist tendencies.
One of this paper’s contributions is to use the business cycle as a proxy for 
macroeconomic conditions, while previous studies used GNP, unemployment rate, or the 
overall trade deficit to measure macroeconomic pressures (See Hansen and Prusa 1996, 
Leidy 1997, and Sabry 2000). Our utilization of the business cycle to capture cyclical 
macroeconomic conditions, has several advantages over conventional approaches, which 
are specified in the empirical analysis section. We also include industry’s capacity 
utilization ratio, import-penetration ratio, and industry level trade deficit to test the 
importance of these statute-required indicators in affecting the ITC’s injury 
determinations. In addition to the above economic determinants, we also evaluate the 
importance of other factors such as industry size and country bias in influencing the 
ITC’s decisions. Inclusion of these variables would allow us to estimate the political 
nature of antidumping protection. For example, a larger industry might be able to impose 
greater political pressure on the ITC, hence is more likely to gain antidumpingprotection.
Literature on the effects of antidumping cases on the entire economy shares 
insights into the recent popularity of antidumping. Its effects on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), bilateral and multilateral trade flow, and domestic output and employment have
been most widely documented. The empirical findings of the seminal work of Staiger and 
Wolak (1994) indicate two non-duty effects of antidumping protection, namely 
“investigation effect” and “suspension effect”, are significant in restricting imports flow 
and expanding output of the import-competing domestic firms. For example, they find 
that investigation effect occurs when an antidumping investigation takes place. The 
success of simply initiating an antidumping investigation reduces total imports during the 
period of investigation by half the magnitude that would be expected if duties were 
imposed from the start of the investigation. Suspension effect occurs when an 
investigation is suspended under the promise by foreign exporters to stop dumping, 
which leads to trade restrictions similar in magnitude to what would have been expected 
if antidumping duties were imposed. Therefore, recognizing such non-duty effects, firms 
might file antidumping petitions with different filing strategies. The outcome filers seek 
the actual imposition of antidumping duties, while the process filers simply seek the 
restrictive effects of the investigation process alone.
Prusa (1996) using data for the 428 antidumping petitions filed between 1980 and 
1988 also finds the trade restricting effects of antidumping investigations. The author 
looks at the trade effects of United States antidumping actions, focusing on the issue of 
trade diversion. His findings suggest that both the rejected cases and the cases with 
antidumping duties imposed have substantial trade-restrictive effect on the named 
country. Specifically, in the year following the final antidumping investigation decision, 
imports from named countries were 9 percent less than they were in the previous year for 
cases with affirmative findings. Surprisingly, the number for rejected cases is 16 percent.
9In addition, significant trade diversion from the named countries to non-named countries 
was observed and was positively associated with the estimated duty. Numerically, while 
imports under antidumping investigation from named countries reduced substantially, the 
data showed a 22 percent increase in like imports from non-named countries during the 
year following the antidumping investigation. Collectively, import growth is hampered 
by the presence of antidumping protection, which, however, is mitigated greatly by the 
trade diversion effects. Such findings are consistent with the view that antidumping 
protection is country-biased in nature. Finally, Prusa (1996) asserts the counter 
competition effects of antidumping protection by pointing out the collusive pricing 
behavior between the domestic producers and their foreign rivals. For instance, by raising 
their dollar prices, foreign exporters provide higher profits margin for domestic producers 
in exchange for not being subject to antidumping allegations.
Another benefit of domestic petitioners from the antidumping protection is 
documented in Neiberging (1999). Using an empirical version of Lemer’s index (defined 
as difference between price and marginal revenue), the author concludes that U.S. firms 
receiving antidumping protection significantly enhanced their domestic market power, 
while firms having their filings rejected suffer a decline in their market power. According 
to such empirical findings, we would expect the industries to make their filing decisions 
based on the likelihood of getting final antidumping protection.
Antidumping protection was also estimated to have significant effects on the flow 
of FDI. Studying the movements of Japanese FDI, Barrell and Pain (1999) conclude that 
the expansion of antidumping protection in the EC and the U.S. during the 1980s has
10
significantly raised the level of Japanese FDI in these countries. Specifically, their study 
shows that when the antidumping cases initiated in the U.S. was considerably higher than 
in the EC in the early 1980s, Japanese FDI to the U.S. expanded rapidly, while the EC 
market continued to be served by means of export sales. Such patterns remained until the 
late 1980s when antidumping cases became more frequent in the EC and Japanese FDI 
flowed into the EC dramatically. Their findings are consistent with the notion that 
antidumping has at times served the host country as a de facto trade policy to promote 
new investment, hence to increase its domestic employment. Therefore, FDI provides a 
means to bypass the non-tariff trade barriers, such as antidumping, as it does to avoid the 
regulation of tariff barriers.
The above empirical studies, along with many others (i.e. Webb, 1992, Conway 
and Dhar, 1994 and Gallaway et al., 1999), imply that antidumping has a strategic 
effect— it promotes domestic interests and stifles international competition rather than 
restore fairness to the trading system. If antidumping has indeed betrayed the basis of its 
traditional advocacy to simply protect domestic industries from injuries caused by foreign 
exporters’ dumping practices, it is then necessary to investigate the factors involved in 
antidumping filing behavior and decision-making processes through the rigors of the 
econometrics testing. The U.S., one of the world’s major antidumping petitioners, 
provides an excellent setting for such empirical estimation.
Before going any further, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of dumping, 
the evidence of which is the premise for initiating an antidumping investigation. An 
understanding of the economics of dumping will help us to analyze the fairness o f the
11
antidumping legislation application. The remainder o f the paper is structured as follows: 
An introduction to the economics of dumping and a historical review of the evolution of 
U.S. antidumping law are provided in the next section. In the third section, we give a 
broad review o f the relevant antidumping theories and empirical studies. Specifications of 
the empirical models and data as well as the discussion of regression results appear in the 
fourth section. Concluding remarks are presented in the final section.
2. Background
2.1 Dumping
For a long time, exporting industries have used dumping, in one form or another, 
to compete in foreign markets. In the early sixteenth century, English scholars blamed 
foreigners for selling paper below the production costs to smother the infant paper 
industry in England. In the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants were charged with 
selling at detrimentally low price in Baltic regions to drive out their French competitors. 
In the eighteenth century, English manufactures were accused of invading the United 
States’ market at ruinously low prices (Viner, 1923). In this section, we will look at two 
common strategies of current dumping activities and explain the economic rationales 
behind firms’ willingness to sell below the best attainable market prices or even below 
costs. We also discuss the effects of such dumping activity on the importing country’s 
economy.
12
The most widely used strategies for dumping are predatory pricing strategy and 
discriminatory monopoly strategy. Imperfect market structure created by a secured home 
market is a crucial premise for the success of such price dumping strategies. Predatory 
pricing is based on the belief that a firm may eventually drive its competitors out of 
business and gain monopoly power over the foreign market at the expense of short-run 
losses due to economically unjustified low prices. As long as the long-run monopolistic 
profits are greater than the short run losses, it would be worthwhile for firms to choose 
this strategy. The problem with such an explanation, however, is the fact that rational 
domestic firms would expect foreign sellers to raise prices eventually. Thus, they would 
try to retain their market shares by matching the lowered market prices, even at the 
expense of considerable short run loss. Therefore, successful implementation of such 
pricing strategy would require a sharp asymmetry in the amount of financial resources 
between foreign and domestic producers. Hence, a more reasonable approach is for both 
sides to collude on the market price rather than to compete with each other and drain their 
financial resources.
The feasibility of predatory pricing strategy has been of great interests to 
economists for a long time. Some scholars claim it to be baseless (McGee, 1958), while 
others, Tirole (1987) for example, find the possible circumstances for such pricing 
strategy. McGee (1958) argues that it was price discrimination rather than the widely 
believed predatory pricing that accounted for Standard Oil’s pricing practice. According 
to McGee, it is rational for the predators to view the temporary loss as an investment in 
future monopoly profits only if the profits are expected to be constant and to exceed the
13
present size of loss to cover the appropriate discount, which is rarely evidenced in 
empirical cases. Tirole (1987), however, contends that a simple duopoly market structure 
combined with several restrictive conditions, such as substantial barriers, would fulfill the 
requirement of successful predatory pricing strategy. His model assumes that there are 
two firms, one domestic and one foreign. It is possible for the foreign firm to invade into 
the importing market through a price-dumping strategy and eventually secure monopoly 
market control. Therefore, such theoretical analysis, though restrictive, implies that the 
assertion of baseless predatory pricing strategy is too strong.
Another explanation to price-dumping behavior is the discriminatory monopoly 
strategy. It is a regular business practice aimed at more limited commercial objectives. 
Firms charge different prices in domestic and foreign markets to maximize profits, 
pursuing economies of scale, building up market share or simply disposing excess 
production capacity. In other words, firms adopt discriminatory monopoly strategy to 
price differentiate, not to drive their competitors out. Even in relatively low-concentrated 
industries, where economists have had difficulty offering a satisfactory economic 
rationale for dumping, such pricing strategy could be lucrative. One possibility is that 
firms in dumping industries may have such agreements as minimum price with the 
government in their home market and that they are unwilling to break these agreements. 
In such events, any excess supply that appears on the home market at the agreed price 
will be sold abroad at a lower price (Hindley, 1991).
In summary, despite potentially different intentions to dump, it has always been 
backed by an essential economic basis—the secured home market endorsed by a mixture
14
of economic and policy instruments, such as government-erected trade barriers (i.e. 
tariff), private-sector trade barriers (i.e. monopoly or oligopoly control), and subsidies 
(i.e. direct or indirect government subsidies). Such a nurturing environments provide an 
economic incentive for dumping. A tightly protected home market allows domestic 
companies to secure sufficiently high profits in the absence of foreign competition. The 
secured home market profits, then, cross-subsidize the exports at dumped prices to 
achieve economies of scale or to dispose of surplus production. Consequently, industries 
in open markets without instruments to level the market price suffer from a decrease in 
market share, depressed profit margin, and thus, decreased funds for R&D investment 
and marketing. Figure 2 provides vivid example of its successful cross-subsidization 
dumping strategy.
Figure 2. Geographic Sources of Profits for Japanese Automakers
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Since the Japanese auto industry has great control over its domestic market with 
the aid of protective trade policies, the high prices charged in the home market yield
15
considerable profits, which are used to finance its price dumping in the developed 
markets such as the U.S. and Europe. A visual inspection of Figure 2 clearly shows that 
while the Japanese auto industry was making profits of about 10 billion dollars in its 
home market in 1988, its businesses operated in the U.S. and Europe experienced net 
losses of about $4 billion and $1 billion respectively. In addition, a comparison of the 
magnitude of losses among the three regions indicates that the opener the targeted market 
is, the larger the scale of dumping tends to be. For instance, among the three regions, the 
U.S. was well in advance promoting free trade policy, which made it easier for the 
Japanese auto producers to enter the market and dump their products in a large scale. As 
a result, the observed net loss of the Japanese auto industry in the United States appears 
to be the largest. Another interesting observation is that the magnitude of losses in the 
three foreign markets is positively related with that of its profits in the home market over 
time.
Figure 2 is consistent with the notion that a successful dumping strategy requires 
a highly protected home market to secure significant profits to finance the dumping in 
foreign markets. While promoting the global free trade system, open market countries 
would not allow such detrimental commercial conducts to stifle the production of their 
own industry. Hence, antidumping law was initiated to shelter these injured domestic 
industries from foreign rivals’ unfair practices. In the next section, we look at the 
evolution of the antidumping regulation in a global context and its introduction into the 
U.S..
16
2.2 History of The Antidumping Law and The World Trade System
2.2.1 The Origin of The Antidumping Law-Canada, 1904
In 1904, Canada faced a political dilemma. Farmers lobbied for lower tariffs, 
while manufacturers lobbied for higher tariffs. This mixed pressure from farmers and 
manufacturers led the government to create a new trade policy instrument to satisfy both 
sides. Finger (1993) documents the invention of antidumping as Canada’s contribution to 
the technique of trade restrictions in the history of commercial policy. New Zealand and 
Australia closely followed Canada and adopted antidumping laws in 1905 and 1906, 
respectively. With the surge in anti-German sentiments during the post World War I era, 
several countries-United States, Great Britain and most British Commonwealth 
countries-had joined the antidumping club by 1921. “It was a response to the alleged 
dumping threat posed by the highly cartelized and heavily protected German industry of 
the period.” (Staiger and Wolak, 1992 p.265) Further development o f antidumping law 
continued through World War II. Most o f the world economic powers had adopted some 
form of antidumping protection by the time of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
2.2.2 Evolution of Antidumping Law in the U.S.
The first antidumping law in the United States incorporated several criteria from 
antitrust legislation, and thus is often viewed as an extension of three antitrust 
statutes-the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Putnam Act. However, the 
“antitrust” nature inherently limited the applicability of the 1916 antidumping law as 
stated in the ITC’s 1919 review (Mastel, 1998, p. 19):
17
“[The 1916 act] apparently fails, where, the Canadian law succeeds, in not 
contemplating in reasonable cases the prohibition of sporadic dumping, since its penalties 
apply only to persons who “commonly and systematically import” foreign articles, and in 
providing that such importation must be make with intent to injure destroy, or prevent the 
establishment of an industry in this country, or to monopolize trade or commerce in the 
imported articles..
Growing out of the failure of the 1916 Act is the 1921 antidumping law. This act 
is more closely modeled after the Canadian act. However, antidumping legislation had 
been generally ignored as a trade policy until the 1975-1979 period. The Tokyo Round of 
trade negotiation, which concluded in 1979, contained two key amendments. First, the 
definition of the LTFV imports was broadened to include imports priced below 
production costs. Second, the Tokyo Round Code revised the Kennedy Round Code and 
repealed the requirement that dumped imports be the demonstrably principal cause of 
material injury before duty could be imposed (Prusa and Skeath, 2001). In recent 
decades, the antidumping issue has been constantly brought to the negotiations under 
GATT. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 and the Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 
1994, for example, have developed detailed instruction on the LTFV determination and 
the Sunset provision.4
A historical review shows that amendments have added considerable protective 
power to the antidumping legislation, hence strengthened petitioners’ chances of getting 
trade protection. For instance, immediately after the Tokyo Round negotiation, 69 new 
antidumping cases were filed in 1980 and 150 cases in 1981 (Prusa and Skeath, 2001). 
The dramatic surge in the number of antidumping applications has raised great interests
4 Please refer to Appendix Table 1 for information that traces the major evolutions of 
U.S. antidumping law.
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among economists. The next section reviews the literature on the administrative 
procedure of antidumping investigation in the U.S., and the determinants of the 
industries’ decisions to file as well as those of the ITC’s injury determinations.
3. Literature Review
Empirical studies related to U.S. antidumping application, filings and outcomes, 
are based on the understanding of its administrative investigation procedure conducted by 
the IT A and the ITC. Several previous studies documented the performance of the two 
agents or the individual commissioners involved in antidumping investigations. Jackson 
and Vermulst (1989), Staiger and Wolak (1994), and DeVault (1996), provide detailed 
background information of antidumping and its practice in the U.S. and in other major 
countries. Baldwin and Steagall (1994) document ITC commissioners’ behaviors within 
the broad limit of U.S. antidumping law.
Our empirical study begins with a review of the procedure of U.S. antidumping 
administration, which clarifies the possible outcomes of the antidumping investigation, 
the responsibility of each party involved, and the timetable for the entire administrative 
procedure.
3.1 Procedure of U.S. Antidumping Investigation
Generally speaking, there are three possible outcomes for an antidumping 
petition: 1) dumping is found and antidumping duties are imposed on imports under 
investigation; 2) petition is terminated without duty imposed; 3) petition is suspended
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with certain agreements to stop dumping reached between the exporting industry and the 
IT A. However, if the suspension agreement is violated, the case will restart at the point 
when suspension was reached.
Specifically, a termination without antidumping duty granted can result from a 
rejection by the ITA to initiate the case, a negative finding of ITC’s preliminary 
investigation, a negative ITA final LTFV finding, or a negative ITC final injury 
determination. In addition, a case can also be terminated without antidumping duty 
imposed, simply because the petitioner withdraws the case.
According to U.S. antidumping law, two findings are necessary before final 
antidumping duties are imposed on the imports in question. First, the ITA must determine 
that the imports are being dumped at LTFV. Specifically, the imports are found to be sold 
at LTFV, if one of the following three situations is observed (Mastel, 1998): 1) imports 
are sold at prices below their home market prices; 2) imports are sold at prices less than 
those in the surrogate market; 3) in the cases lacking reliable information of the above 
criteria, demonstration that imports are priced below a constructed value, the costs of 
production, is applied.5
Second, the ITC is responsible for material injury determination. Tharakan (1991) 
provides a detailed description of the administrative system of the ITC, an independent 
agency composed of three Republicans and three Democrats. The commissioners are 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the U.S. senate for a nine-year term. The 
chairmanship of the ITC rotates between Republicans and Democrats every two years.
5 A surrogate market is the market of reference.
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According to Tharakan (1991), U.S. antidumping law directs the ITC to consider the 
following eighteen factors in deciding material injury: the price o f the dumped imports 
(price undercutting), increase in volume of dumped import, the price of the U.S. like 
product (price suppression or depression), domestic output, domestic sales, domestic 
inventories; domestic market share, output growth; the total volume of dumped imports, 
utilization of capacity, cash flow, profits, productivity, return on investment, ability to 
raise capital, employment, and wage.
The ITC must demonstrate that the imports under investigation are causing 
material injury to the domestic industry producing the same or like products. 6 
Unfortunately, the statutory measurement for material injury is neither quantitative nor 
operatively defined. U.S. antidumping law defines material injury as “harm that is not 
inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant”. 7 Beyond the minimum level set for 
dumping margin and imports, there is no set level af which injury is certainly occurring or 
certainly not occurring.8 According to Article VI of the 1994 GATT, the term “injury” 
shall be taken to mean material injury to the domestic industry, threat of material injury 
to domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry.
6 The GATT Code Article 2 interprets the term “like product” to be a product which is 
identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of 
such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has 
characteristic closely resembling those of the product under consideration.
7 Tariff Act of 1930, Section 771 [7][A],
The minimum size of the dumping margin for antidumping duties to be imposed is 2 
percent. To be subject to antidumping duties, imports from the alleged dumper must 
account for 3 percent of total imports.
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Such vague statutory standards give the ITC considerable discretion in judging 
whether or not material injury occurred. In practice, each of the six ITC commissioners 
chooses his or her personal approach to investigate the injury. Kaplan (1991) does an 
excellent job in explaining the five commonly used approaches to reach material injury 
determinations in U.S. antidumping investigations.
Weak 201, the first approach, treats antidumping cases as analogous to the 
escape clause cases raised under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.9 Affirmative 
material injury determination under this approach requires that the domestic industry be 
materially injured with dumped imports being the cause. However, standards required for 
a positive injury finding under the Weak 201 approach differ from those required in the 
escape cases investigations. The Weak 201 approach requires harm that is not 
inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant, while the escape clause investigation 
requires the harm to be serious and the imports to be the substantial cause.
Trend analysis, the second approach, is similar to Weak 201 in its requirement 
for the affirmative injury findings. However, trend analysis requires a direct causal link 
between the imports alone and material injury, while affirmative finding in Weak 201 
approach simply requires the evidence that imports are among the causes of material 
injury.
9 Under Section 201, the ITC decides whether imports have been a substantial cause of 
serious injury to relevant domestic industries. If the ITC rules affirmatively, it makes 
recommendations to the president about temporary trade protection. No unfair trade 
practices need to be proved. If the president accepted the ITC’s recommendation, trade 
restrictions are imposed on all countries’ exports of affected product. However, trade 
compensation in form of lowered tariff on other products should be offered to the 
affected exporting nations (Krueger, 1996).
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The Margin Analysis, the third approach, is characterized by its counter factual 
framework: it considers what the condition of the domestic industry would have been had 
imports not been dumped. Commissioners employing such an approach would find the 
imports to cause injury if the dumping margins are greater than underselling margins.
An approach similar to the Marginal Analysis is the Comparative Analysis 
approach. Injury and cause are considered simultaneously in this approach. It proceeds in 
three steps. First, the dumping margin and other relevant information are used to evaluate 
the effect of dumping on the price of the LTFV imports. Then the price effect is related to 
the demand effect on domestic like products. Finally, the effects of the shifts in demand 
for the domestic like product is decomposed into a change in price and a change in 
quantity.
Finally, Five Factor analysis is similar to Weak 201 and Trend Analysis in its 
requirement for a separate material injury and causation tests. But it is distinguished by 
the requirement for evidence of predatory intent (Kaplan, 1991). The above five 
approaches cover commonly used methods by the ITC commissioners in their injury 
investigation. To understand the ITC’s decision-making procedure, however, requires an 
integration of these approaches. As Kaplan cautions, reasoning from several of the 
approaches can be sometimes found in a single determination.
Mastel (1998) and Staiger and Wolak (1994) provide ample information on the 
timetable for the U.S. antidumping investigation process. According to U.S. antidumping 
law, once a case is filed by the domestic industry, the ITA has 20 days to determine 
whether the petition satisfies the basic requirements for subsequent investigation. If so,
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four stages of subsequent administrative investigation begin with the ITC’s preliminary 
injury determination.
After the case is filed by a domestic industry, the ITC has 45 days to make its 
preliminary determination of injury. If the petition fails the ITC preliminary 
determination, the petition is terminated. Otherwise, the investigation moves to its second 
stage-ITA preliminary LTFV determination.
The ITA preliminary LTFV finding must occur within 115 days of the ITC 
preliminary finding or within 160 days after the initial petition was filed. A finding of no 
dumping or a dumping margin of less than 2 percent would result in a negative finding, 
but will not terminated the case.10 If the finding is affirmative, the importers are subject 
to a “suspension of liquidation”, which normally requires the importer to post a bond or a 
guaranteed payment of duty from this point on. Thus, the investigation moves to its third 
stage with either negative or affirmative result in the ITA preliminary determination.
The ITA’s final LTFV determination, based on further information and comments 
from previous investigation, must conclude within 75 days after its preliminary LTFV 
determination or 235 days after the petition was filed. If this final determination ends 
with a negative finding, the case is terminated. Otherwise, the investigation moves to its 
last stage.
ITC final determination comes within 45 days of the ITA final LTFV 
determination or 280 days after the case was filed. To reach a final affirmative “material 
injury” finding, at least 3 commissioners must come up with affirmative findings. If the
10 Dumping margin is the difference between the home market price and the export price; 
or more generally, the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price.
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final determination is negative, the case is terminated, the bond requirement repealed and 
no antidumping duty imposed. However, if  the ITC final decision is affirmative, the ITA 
has 7 days to instruct customs to assess the appropriate antidumping duties. The time 
horizon over which the antidumping duties are imposed would be based on three possible 
situations. First, if  the ITA preliminary LTFV determination is negative, duties equal to 
the dumping margins are imposed on or after the date of ITC final determination. 
Alternatively, if  the ITA preliminary finding was affirmative, the duties equal to dumping 
margins are imposed back to the date of the suspension of liquidation. Finally, in case of 
critical circumstances, the duties will be imposed back to 90 days before the ITA 
preliminary determination. This process is summarized In Figure 3 adopted from Staiger 
and Wolak (1994).
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3.2. Previous Empirical Studies11
3.2.1 Industries’ Antidumping Filing Behavior
The determinants and economic impacts of antidumping petitions have been of 
increasing interests to researchers in international economics and political economics. 
Takacs (1981) pioneers the research in this field. Using OLS, she estimates the trade 
related and domestic macroeconomic determinants of the number of requests for escape 
clause investigations and the proportion of successful escape clause cases in the U.S. 
during the period 1949-1979. She finds that fewer escape clause cases would be initiated 
when real GNP is higher, when the rate of capacity utilization is higher, when the 
unemployment rate is lower, when the trade deficit is lower, and when import penetration 
is lower.
The importance of industry level factors is also tested by Finger (1981), who finds 
negative effects of an increase in the industrial import penetration ratio and a decrease in 
the capacity utilization ratio on the incidence of LTFV complaints. The results of both 
studies suggest that deteriorations in both industry level and general economic 
performances increase demand for trade protections against LTFV imports. It is 
consistent with the conventional wisdom that it is relatively easy for a booming domestic 
economy to absorb competition from imports without imposing severe adjustment costs 
on domestic firms and workers. But any increase in imports will worsen the sluggish 
economic status, idle production capacity, and thus raise the unemployment rate and hurt 
domestic industries. Therefore, demand for trade protection is expected to vary with the
11 For summary of selected empirical studies, use Appendix Table 2.
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cyclical performance of the economy. In addition, Takacs’ study also indicates a strong 
“demonstration effect”, meaning higher success rate on cases filed in the previous year 
appears to encourage more petitions. Taken together, these findings imply that industries’ 
filing decisions do not only depend on the presence of dumping activities but also hinge 
on the likelihood of getting affirmative injury determination from the ITC.
Importance of industry level determinants of antidumping filing decisions is 
found in recent studies using different models and covering wide time horizons. Herander 
and Schwartz (1984) analyze LTFV cases filed between 1976 and 1981. They find that 
increases in import penetration and the degree of domestic industry’s unionization 
significantly raise the incidence of antidumping filings. Also indicated in their study is 
that the potential payoff from a successful antidumping petition, measured by the ratio of 
wage payments to value-added, is positively associated with filing incidences. Feinberg 
and Hirsch (1989) study LTFV cases filed between 1980 and 1986 using a Tobit model 
with 3-digit SIC level data. They find similar conclusions, indicating that large capital- 
intensive industries, particularly those facing decreasing employment and rising import 
penetration are most likely to file LTFV complaints.
Hansen (1990) uses a logit model to estimate LTFV cases investigated by the ITC 
between 1975 and 1984. She concludes that an increase in domestic industries’ market 
share is negatively associated with their tendency to file antidumping petitions. 
Additionally, she also considers the effect of tariff protection granted to the petitioning 
industry and finds that industries with tariff protection are less likely to resort to 
antidumping investigation for help. For example, the textile industry is protected by
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import quotas and, thus, is less likely to lobby for antidumping protection. Leidy (1997) 
estimates the response of petitioners to changes in the civilian unemployment rate and in 
the rate of industrial capacity utilization using an OLS model over a 10 years period, 
from 1986 to 1995. He finds industries are more likely to file antidumping petition, the 
higher the civilian unemployment rate and the lower the industry capacity utilization rate.
Krupp (1994) focusing on U.S. chemical industries, analyzes factors motivating 
the decision to file using a poisson model and panel data covering the period from 1976 
to 1988. She finds that 1 percent increase in import penetration increased the likelihood 
o f filing incidence by 4-11 percent and a 100-fold increase in the number of production 
workers raised the filing incidence by 2-4 percent. Besides, both the higher profit margin 
and the overall healthier performance of the chemical industry (measured by the chemical 
and allied products production index) are negatively associated with filing incidences. 
Sabry (2000) finds a positive relationship between the industry capacity utilization ratio 
and the likelihood of filing antidumping petition in the cases of lower concentrated 
industry.12 For instance, assuming the import ratio is 50 percent, the probability of filing 
doubles as the capacity utilization of low-concentrated (HHI=400) industry doubles. She 
argues that a low concentrated industry stands a better chance o f setting higher prices 
only if  the market demand is high and capacity is constrained. Therefore, lower 
concentrated industries gain more from restricting imports when capacity utilization is 
high than when there is excess capacity and low demand.
12 Her results show a positive sign for the interaction term of capacity utilization and a 
dummy variable for low-concentration industries.
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An issue that is gaining increasing attention is the effect of macroeconomic 
factors on domestic industries’ filing patterns. A few early works examine the effect of 
macroeconomic performance on the aggregated country level antidumping filing 
incidences. Feinberg (1989), for example, estimates the effect of exchange rate 
movements on U.S. antidumping petitions against four major trading partners (Brazil, 
Japan, Korea, and Mexico) from 1982 to 1987. His findings indicate that due to imperfect 
pass-through of the exchange rate, a depreciation of the US dollar leads to an immediate 
lower price of imports and, thus, increasing incidence in antidumping petitions. Leidy 
(1997), however, comes to a substantially different conclusion. His results imply that the 
surge in antidumping cases from 1981 to 1985 was due in part to the significant 
appreciation of the US dollar. Based on OLS regressions, he concludes, “ ...pressure for 
protection in the U.S. under AD/CVD have heightened during macroeconomic down 
turns and receded with higher level of resources utilization.” (Leidy, 1997, p. 132)
Knetter and Prusa (2000) also find little support to the imperfect pass-through 
effect of exchange rate movements found by Feinberg (1989). The authors estimate 
aggregate antidumping filings by U.S., Canada, EU and Australia from 1980 to 1998. 
Using OLS, poisson, and negative binominal regressions models, the authors find that a 
one-standard deviation real appreciation of the domestic currency increases filings by 33 
percent. This is because US dollar depreciation makes foreign goods more expensive, 
which, in turn, decreases import penetration making an affirmative injury determination 
less likely. Industries basing their filing decisions on anticipated outcomes would be less 
likely to file. Empirical results also show that a one-standard deviation fall in the filing
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country’s real GDP growth leads to a 23 percent increase in antidumping filings. A 
similar negative relation is found by Takacs (1981). Collectively, theses studies suggest 
that imports are more likely to be blamed for causing injurious effects when the overall 
economic condition is poor, implying the strategic motivation behind antidumping 
petitions.
Other industry characteristics are also found to be determinants of antidumping 
petitions. Both Finger (1981) and Feinberg and Hirsch (1989) use the size of petitioning 
industry as a proxy of the industry’s political power and find that large industries are 
more likely to file antidumping petitions. Herander and Schwartz (1984) give additional 
consideration to the impact of potential payoff to the domestic industry from obtaining 
protections, which is measured by the ratio of wage payments to value-added at the 4- 
digit SIC level and the total value of industrial capital stock. Positive effects of both 
variables are found to be significant. Consistently, the positive effect of unionization 
indicates that the more organized is the labor force, the greater its ability to push its 
interests and, thus, the greater the likelihood the industry will lobby for trade protection.
The significance of these variables, therefore, implies that needs for restoration of 
a fair trading system cannot fully account for the observed antidumping filing patterns. 
Industries anticipate and incorporate the factors that affect the ITC’s injury decision into 
their filing decisions. Hence, to obtain a comprehensive understanding of antidumping 
activities, a few studies such as Takacs (1981), Finger (1981), Herander and Schwartz 
(1984), Hansen (1990), and Leidy (1997) adopt a two-sides approach, addressing both the 
demand for and the supply of antidumping practice. One unique perspective of Hansen’s
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study is that it simultaneously accounts for the determinants of both demand and supply 
sides of policy protection. Her study suggests that, on the demand side, interest groups 
seek trade protection when they believe that the ensuing benefits are larger than the costs 
incurred. Industries self-select in their application for protection from the ITC. Therefore, 
the factors affecting the filing decisions are similar to those affecting the ITC’s injury 
determination. Thus, by looking deeper into the supply side of the antidumping practice, 
we can better understand the implicit impetus behind allegations for antidumping 
protection.
As we will see, the empirical studies concerning the determinants of the injury 
investigation outcomes give consideration to a broad range of microeconomic, 
macroeconomic and political variables that may cause discretions in the ITC’s decision 
making procedure. However, substantially different results are reported on the basis of 
different regression models with data across different periods.
3.2.2 The ITC’s Decision Making
Finger (1981) studies the period between 1975 and 1979 and finds that variables 
such as industry import penetration and capacity utilization do affect the incidence of 
affirmative injury determination. Large industries are systematically favored by the ITC 
in granting trade protections. Since it is widely believed that the surge of antidumping 
activities in the U.S. cannot solely be explained by increases in unfair trade practices, 
recent studies have given increasing consideration to the effects of variables such as 
industries’ political power. However, there is no consensus as to their impacts.
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Baldwin (1985) maintains that the statutory requirement should keep the ITC 
impartial and insulated from outside pressures. He argues that in the semi-judicial 
working environment, impartiality and technical competence tend to be the best ways for 
individual commissioners to gain the respect of fellow commissioners and outside 
groups. Therefore, a commissioner is most likely to make decisions based on a strict 
interpretation of the antidumping statute by following a measurable set of economic 
standards in material injury determinations. Goldstein and Lenway (1989) reaffirm the 
apolitical nature of the ITC’s determinations. They use principal-agent theory to examine 
the relationship between Congress and the ITC through the estimation of escape clause 
cases. Their empirical results suggest that political forces in Congress do not have a 
direct influence on the ITC. In contrast to Finger (1981) and Baldwin (1985), however, 
the authors claim that the estimated insignificant coefficients on industry-specific 
variables such as shipments, import level, and employment changes suggest that the ITC 
develops its own criteria that are wholly independent of the statutory requirements. Such 
a claim is opposed to findings of ensuing studies (See e.g., Hansen, 1990 and Moore 
1992) and may suffer from measurement and specification problems.
Hansen (1990) applies a nested-logit model to test both the demand for and the 
supply of trade protection from 1974 through 1984, challenging the insignificance of 
political pressure claimed in the above studies. Her results suggest that outcomes of the 
ITC injury investigation are subject to domestic political forces. Specifically, she finds 
that larger industries located in a district whose senator is a Democrat and a member of 
Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means or whose Representative is the Chair of the
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Ways and Means Committee stand a better chance of getting an affirmative injury 
determination. Moore (1992) analyzes the individual ITC commissioners’ antidumping 
decisions between 1980 and 1986, using a standard probit model. His findings suggest 
that although commissioners use criteria consistent with the instruction set forth in the 
legislation, the ITC has been an imperfect barrier between vote-seeking politicians and 
protection-seeking interests. “While the success of an industry in obtaining relief in the 
antidumping process depends on the objective facts of its petition, those fortunate enough 
to be represented by strategically placed politicians are more likely to be successful in 
obtaining protection.” (Moore, 1992 p.465) For example, Moore (1992) finds that falling 
production and increased volume of allegedly dumped imports are important factors in 
the commissioners’ decisions. On the other hand, the evidence also shows that petitions 
involving the constituencies of the Senate Trade Subcommittee are systematically 
favored. The latter result, however, should be interpreted with caution as the author notes 
that industries in the districts of members of the House Trade Subcommittee are more 
likely to get a negative finding when the final decision are analyzed separately.
Baldwin and Steagall (1994) reaffirm the importance of industrial economic 
variables with a more recent sample covering antidumping and countervailing cases 
determined between 1980 and 1990. The authors, however, emphasize the political 
economy perspective o f the ITC’s decisions implied in the estimation results. The 
insignificant ‘penetration of unfair imports’ in their study indicates that the ITC does not 
require a tight causal relationship between unfair trade and material injury. Rather, the 
increase in industry openness to all imports is blamed for the injurious effects. In
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addition, the authors point out that since the commissioners are nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, they are likely to serve the trade policy objectives 
of these politicians who seek to maximize the political support of electorates. In the 
height of the Cold War, for example, U.S. trade policy is directed to maintain an open 
domestic market in order to secure the political alignments with non-communist nations. 
For example, the standard for obtaining protection via the escape clause was raised in the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 by requiring petitioners to demonstrate that the increase in 
imports causing injury resulted primarily from prior trade agreement concessions 
(Takacs, 1981). In contrast, the antidumping and countervailing duty (CVD) protection in 
the 1980s manifested the increasing public concerns about U.S. industries’ international 
competitiveness. The shift towards more protectionist sentiments among the public 
allowed U.S. politicians to tighten trade policy and to favor particular industries. 
Consequently, industries important in employment and political contributions were more 
likely get trade protection from ITC.
Another issue related to the ITC’s impartiality in making decisions is its 
vulnerability towards general economic pressures. Takacs (1981) uses OLS to estimate 
the impact of macroeconomic factors on the number of escape clause cases filed between 
1962 and 1979. While asserting the significant negative relation between the overall 
domestic economic health and the annual number of the United States escape case filings, 
she finds little evidence that macroeconomic conditions (measured by real GNP level and 
unemployment rate) have impacts on the ITC’s decisions. In other words, although the 
demand for protection heightened during economic downturns, administration authorities
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do not seem to succumb to increased protectionist pressures. The author interprets the 
observed ITC’s immunity toward outside pressures as the government’s reluctance to 
duplicate the counterproductive beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930s.
Hansen (1990) challenges Takacs’ claim by showing that decreases in national 
employment is a good predictor for getting protection from the ITC. Moore (1992) 
revisits the issue and verifies the importance of macroeconomic factors. Hansen and 
Prusa (1997) postulate that the two-dimension effects of the macroeconomic factors 
accounts for the statistically insignificant macroeconomic variables in their estimation. 
According to their interpretation, while a large trade deficit may exert additional political 
pressure on the ITC to provide trade relief, economic recessions would make it harder for 
petitioning industries to prove that unfair trade is causing injuries. Mah (2000) estimates 
the effects o f domestic as well as international general economic conditions on the ITC’s 
injury determination. Using data from 1975 to 1994 and using an error correction model, 
he finds that “ ...there is a long run equilibrium relationship between growth rate of 
percentage of affirmative antidumping decision and real GNP growth rate.. .’’(Mah, 2000 
p .1708).
Sabry (2000) uses univariate probit and bivariate probit models with sample 
selection to study what factors affect the probability of filing antidumping petitions, the 
dumping margin estimates and the probability of successful petitions between 1986 and 
1992. Her results are generally similar to those of previous studies. Highly concentrated 
industries are more likely to file antidumping petition and the ITC is not insulated from 
outside political and general economic pressures in making its injury determination.
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Interestingly, she finds that industries with low concentration will file antidumping 
petitions only when demand increases to a high level. This result is in contrast to the 
conventional wisdom that pressure for protection builds up when the industry’s economic 
condition deteriorates. According to Sabry (2000), market competition would keep price 
at marginal cost when there is excess production capacity. Since firms in low­
concentrated industries have little power over setting prices, when there is excess 
production capacity, an increase in demand would not put upward pressure on prices. 
When capacity is constrained, however, a perfectly competitive industry gains the power 
to increase prices, hence would have an incentive to restrict the entry of imports for 
higher profits. There is no incentive for firms to initiate antidumping petitions till the gain 
outweighs the burdensome legislation costs.
One common theme behind these studies is whether or not macroeconomic 
determinants affect industries’ filing decisions and the ITC’s injury determinations. Some 
of the most widely used macroeconomic measurements include real GNP level and 
unemployment rate (Takacs, 1981), percentage change U.S. trade deficits (Hansen, 
1990), and change in production employment (Moore, 1992). Our empirical analysis is 
distinguished from previous studies by using a different measurement of the 
macroeconomic variable. In the next section, we develop the econometric models to test 
the effect of macroeconomic pressures on both the industries’ filing decisions and the 
ITC’s injury decisions. Other determinants are also estimated.
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4. Econometric Models and Data
In this section, we present the econometric models used to estimate the 
determinants o f industries’ antidumping filing decisions and outcomes o f the ITC’s injury 
determinations. Our primary goal is to test whether industries’ filing behavior and the 
outcomes of the ITC’s injury determinations would vary over economic upturns and 
downturns. For example, we attempt to estimate whether industries are more likely to file 
antidumping petitions during economic downturns and whether the ITC would be more 
likely to vote to protect when the domestic economy is faltering. Our methodology 
consists of applying panel count regressions to test the industries’ filing behavior and a 
standard probit model to investigate determinants of the ITC’s final injury decisions.
4.1 Data
13The antidumping case data used in this paper are provided by Blonigen. Only 
U.S. antidumping cases filed between 1980 and 1995 are selected because of significant 
changes in U.S. antidumping law in 1979. We restrict our sample to cases flied by firms 
in manufacturing industries. This consists of 94 percent o f all cases filed.14 Thus, 
antidumping cases filed between 1980 and 1995 at 4-digit SIC level for manufacturing 
industries constitute our panel data. We estimate an unbalanced panel with 1281 
observations because data for some industries are missing for some years. As for the 
analysis o f the determinants of the ITC’s decisions, we collected all U.S. antidumping
,13 Please refer to Data Appendix.
14 Appendix Table 3 reports the number of antidumping cases filed between 1980 and 
1995 at 2-digit SIC level for manufacturing industries.
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cases that reach the final ITC determination between 1980 and 1996. This gives us totally 
480 cases. This sample is selected for two reasons: First, since the criteria for LTFV test 
is often constructed in favor o f domestic petitioners, ITA rejects only five percent of the 
petitions. In this sense, ITC’s decision making plays a crucial role in judging the fairness 
o f the U.S. antidumping administration. Second, since the material injury standard for 
final decisions is weaker than that for preliminary decision, the ITC is more vulnerable to 
outside pressures in making the final determination (Baldwin and Steagall, 1994). 
Detailed description of the data and their sources appear in the data appendix. Descriptive 
statistics and the variables correlation coefficients appear in Appendix Table 4 and 5.
4.2.1 Modeling Industries’ Filing Decisions
To estimate the determinants of U.S. industries’ decision making behavior in 
filing antidumping petitions, we use poisson panel regression. The dependent variable 
used is the annual count of antidumping petitions filed by each industry (on a 4-digit SIC 
basis) from 1980 to 1995. Among a variety of models constructed for estimating count 
data, the poisson regression model is most widely used. Since the annual number of 
antidumping petitions filed is non-negative number with mean value smaller than 5, 
applying OLS model to count data can result in inefficient, inconsistent, and biased 
estimates (Long, 1997).
We assume that the annual counts have a poisson distribution with a conditional 
mean, /uit, that is a function of the independent variables contained in the matrix xit.
Yi-PlVu = ® A 1
= e , > , i = l  — N , t  = l — T
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where Yit is the annual count of antidumping cases filed an industry, ft is the vector o f
coefficients. xit is a matrix containing following independent variables: [CYCLE/;, CAP ih
IMPR/;, DEFICIT/;, SIZE/;, CUMUL/;]15, and a { s are the industrial-specific parameters, i
indexes N industries and t indexes T years. CYCLE measures macroeconomic conditions 
and is calculated as the portion of each year counted into economic upturns. CAP is 
defined as percent o f the establishments’ maximum level o f production capacity is being 
used. IMPR is industry import penetration ratio. It is defined as the ratio of industry 
imports to the sum of industry output and imports. Industry trade deficit is measured by 
DEFICIT, which is calculated by subtracting industry’s annual imports value from its 
annual exports value. SIZE is included as a proxy for industries’ political power and is 
measured by the value of industry shipments. Finally, CUMUL is a year dummy for 1984 
onwards selected as a control for the possible effect of “mandatory cumulating” 
amendment enacted in 1984. We choose the poisson distribution to apply the conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation. Following Cameron and Trivedi (1998), a fixed-effect 
specification is defined as
Pr
i
yn>->ytr (Z,^)
r u ! n
r  , \y, t
exp(*„/g)
vZ sexp(*;sy3) (1)
Thus, the conditional log-likelihood function is as follows:
4 ( /? )= n
i=i
In Z y-u - Z ]n(y » !> + Z y « ln
(  . A
exp(xufi)
t= l t =1 j
(2)
15 Please refer to Table 1 for variable construction details.
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The standard poisson regression model assumes equality between the conditional mean 
and the conditional variance of the counts. In practice, this feature can be violated with 
the conditional variance being greater than the conditional mean, which is known as over­
dispersion. It might be caused by unobserved heterogeneity, which is not controlled by 
the panel data. A class o f models has been constructed to account for over-dispersion by 
mixing the poisson distribution with a second distribution. In present study, we estimate
the negative binominal (NB) model, where y it has an NB distribution with mean
a  /L aand variance 1 1 x (1 h— L) . a { and Xit are defined m the above poisson model. is the 
<t>> <Pi
negative binominal over-dispersion parameter, with a Gamma distribution. For a fixed- 
effect NB model, the conditional maximum likelihood approach is defined as follows:
Pr
t=l
' n  r ) x r(X,y,)r(I>,. ,  +1) 
1,1r(^)r(>.,+i)J r  ( X ,4 +2 > j (3)
Where T(.) denotes the Gamma function defined as T(v) = J® t y xe (d t . The log- 
likelihood function is then specified as follows:16
i= \
l n r ( ± A X l n r ( ± y it+l
\t=i )  V t=i
-  lnT + '£ ,y i.
\  t =i
it
t=i y
+ X  {In r(A , + y„ ) -  In r ( 4 ) -  In T{yu +1)}
/=1
(4)
The central issue is to estimate how U.S. industries’ filing behavior varies with the 
business cycle. According to conventional studies, antidumping law is not unlike other
16 See Cameron and Trivedi (1998) for details.
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regular trade protection instruments, providing a shelter to protect domestic industry from 
foreign competition. Struggling with declined consumption demand, decreased 
profitability or increased idle production capacity during economic downturns, domestic 
industries are more likely to seek antidumping protection for economic relief. It is also 
plausible that domestic industries would expect their petitions to be more appealing given 
the overall poor economic condition, since the ITC is less likely to upset the petitioners 
due to increased protectionist sentiments among the general public during an economic 
downturn. Therefore, domestic industries are more likely to file antidumping cases during 
economic downturns when they stand a better chance of getting affirmative injury 
determinations.
An alternative strategic filing behavior is proposed by Prusa (1992) and Staiger and 
Wolak (1994). The authors argue that domestic industries might file antidumping 
petitions simply for the trade deterring effect of the investigation itself rather than the 
imposition of antidumping duties (Prusa, 1992). For example, Prusa (1992) finds that, on 
average, about one-third of the total antidumping cases filed between 1980 and 1985 
were withdrawn. Taken together, these suggest a counter cyclical behavior of filing 
decisions against the business cycle. Thus, we expect CYCLE to have a negative sign.
Three industry level economic variables are included. Capacity utilization ratio 
(CAP) is expected to have a negative sign, while import penetration ratio (IMPR) is 
expected to have a positive sign. Trade deficit (DEFICIT) is expected to be negatively 
associated with the incidence of antidumping filings. Capital utilization ratio directly 
measures the performance of the domestic industries. Lower CAP implies higher fixed
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production cost per unit o f production, which decreases the industry’s profitability and 
motivates industries to lobby for trade protection. Industries facing increasing IMPR or 
decreasing DEFICIT are more likely to file antidumping petition. This is because 
increasing import-penetration means shrinking market share for domestic producers, 
leading them to lobby for protections in an effort to secure their market shares and relieve 
them o f competition pressures from foreign rivals. In addition, since an increase in IMPR 
and a decrease in CAP are among the statutory requirements for an affirmative injury 
determination, the suffering industries would have a greater chance of getting 
antidumping protection. Therefore, they are more likely to resort to antidumping petition 
for trade protection in the face of lower CAP, higher IMPR and lower DEFICIT. 
t We also hypothesize that larger industries are more likely to file antidumping 
petitions. Filing an antidumping petition, a costly administrative option, incurs 
burdensome legislation costs need to be backed by well-organized administration system 
and financial support. In addition, large industries often give large political contributions 
hence have greater political power to lobby for protection. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that industries with larger SIZE to initiate more antidumping cases.
Finally, CUMUL is expected to have a positive sign. “Mandatory cumulating” 
amendment enacted in 1984 (CUMUL) is generally believed to have eased the standards 
for affirmative material injury determination. Since the effects o f alleged dumped imports 
are now evaluated additively, non-named countries might be more cautious raising their 
exports. Thus, cumulation amendment also helps to prevent the trade diversion effects 
from the named countries to the non-named countries (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001).
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Industry would perceive such amendment as a shift towards protectionism that increases 
their benefit from and chances of getting antidumping protection.
The effects are summarized in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all variables are 
summarized in Appendix Table 4. In the next section, we present the empirical results 
from different specifications o f the count model. Validity of the estimates is discussed 
with formal tests.
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Table 1. Predicted Effects of Independent Variables —  Filing Decision
Variable Name Definition Expected
Sign
Macroeconomic
variable
CYCLE ' • Business cycle
Calculated as the portion of each year 
that is in economic upturns:
months ofeconomicupturnC i  LLEt
12
Negative
Industry-level 
economic variable 
CAP • Industry capacity utilization ratio. 
Defined as percent of the establishments’ 
maximum level of production capacity is 
being used CAP,./*
Negative
IMPR • Import-penetration Ratio. Calculated as 
import t_ j 
output f_, + import
Positive
DEFICIT • Trade deficit of the Industry under
investigation. Calculated as
Value o f Exports t-i — Value o f Imports t.j
Negative
Other variables
SIZE • The size of petitioning industry, 
measured by the value of industry 
shipments (in million dollars)
Positive
CUMUL • Dummy variable to estimate the effect of 
1984 “mandatory cumulating” 
amendment to the antidumping law 
CUMULt ~ I, for 1984 and thereafter 
CUMULt = 0, otherwise
Positive
* t : The year case is filed
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4.2.2 Analysis o f Results
Columns two through five of Table 2 present the coefficient estimates for the 
poisson and NB models respectively. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the use o f panel
• • 17regression is appropriate for either the poisson or NB models.
To address potential over-dispersion, we perform both poisson and NB models. 
Comparing the values o f Wald Chi-squared statistics, we find that neither fixed effect nor 
random effect specification of the NB model is significant at the 10 percent significance 
level. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the independent variables are 
jointly insignificant, Pi = P2 = P3 = P4 = Ps = P6 = 0. In contrast, the Wald test statistics for 
poisson model are significant at the 1 percent level o f significance, which resoundingly 
rejected the null hypothesis, Pi = P2 — P3 — p4 = Ps -  p6 = 0. Our finding of the better 
performance of poisson model is theoretically predicted by Cameron and Trivedi (1998). 
As the authors point out, a common reason for using the NB model with cross-section 
data is to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The use of panel regression already 
controls for unobserved heterogeneity, and the use of poisson panel regression is 
sufficient. Hence, we will focus on analyzing the regression results from the poisson 
model.
Results from both the fixed effects and random effects models are presented in 
Table 2. Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model is preferred. Specifically, the 
calculated Hausman test statistics is significant at the 1 percent significance level.
1 7 Results of Pooled poisson, NB, and ZIP models are quantitatively similar. Please refer 
to Appendix Table 6.
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Table 2.
Poisson and Negative Binominal Estimation on Industries’ Filing Decision37
Variable
Poisson Regression
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Negative Binominal Regression
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Constant - 0.32099 -1.21698** -1.61662**
- (0.372) (0.041) (0.003)
CYCLE -0.42294** -0.36660* -0.34633 -0.29136
(0.035) (0.066) (0.347) (0.430)
CAP -0.01783** -0.01697** -0.01060 -0.00513
(0.000) (0.000) (0.131) (0.423)
IMPR 0.01879 0.00777 -0.00739 0.00151
(0.111) (0.375) (0.486) (0.833)
DEFICIT 0.00005** 0.00002 -0.00002 2.15E-06
(0.002) (0.218) (0.489) (0.899)
SIZE 2.87E-06 8.21E-06** 8.29E-06** 7.53E-06**
(0.405) (0.001) (0.024) (0.021)
CUMUL 0.46239** 0.44867** 0.26779 0.20238
(0.002) (0.002) (0.313) (0.433)
Number of 1281 1281 1281 1281
Observations
Likelihood 1429.67 81.46
ratio tes tb/ (d f=01) W = o i)
Wald 32.78 0df=  6) 30.73 (df=  6) 9.01 (df=  6) 7.35 (df=  6)
ChiSquare
Statistics
Hausman test 57.62 (df= 6) 7.22 (df=  6)
Notes: a/ the numbers in parentheses are the p-values
b/ likelihood ratio test o f a  = 0; the statistics follow a x 2 distribution 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level with two-tailed test.
**Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level with two-tailed test.
As shown in Table 2, CYCLE, CAP and CUMUL are statistically significant at 
the 5 percent significance level with expected signs. DEFICIT is statistically significant 
at the 5 percent significance level but with an unexpected positive sign. IMPR and SIZE 
are not statistically significant.
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The estimation results indicate that antidumping filings are negatively affected by 
the business cycle. Specifically, industries file more antidumping petitions during 
economic downturns and less during economic upturns. Such empirical finding lends 
support to the notion that domestic industries tend to seek relief from trade policy to 
block out their foreign rivals, in the face o f declining demand and increasing 
unemployment during economic slowdown (Takacs, 1981). Like wise, Leidy (1997) 
reports a negative relationship between the number of antidumping/countervailing 
petitions and the well-being of the overall domestic economy during 1986-1995. Knetter 
and Prusa (2000) study a larger sample o f U.S. aggregated antidumping filings covering 
1980 through 1998. They also find that declines in real GDP lead to increased 
antidumping filings. Our estimation results are in line with the notion that industries 
based their filing decisions on anticipated likelihood of getting protection. Industry 
performance is adversely affected during economic downturns making it more likely to 
satisfy the statutory requirements for affirmative injury determination. On the other hand, 
protectionist sentiment among the general public rises during economic downturns 
adding pressure on the ITC to grant protection. Therefore, domestic industries would 
reasonably perceive economic slowdowns as a ‘good time’ for better chances o f getting 
antidumping protection and increase filing incidence accordingly.
As expected, a decrease in CAP indicates that idled production facilities and 
partially operating workforce decrease profitability. Therefore, the suffered industry 
would increase antidumping filings for economic relief. The observed negative 
relationship between industrial capacity utilization ratio and the incidence of antidumping
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filings is consistent with the empirical findings of previous studies, such as Coughlin et 
al. (1989), Staiger and Wolak (1994), and Leidy (1997).
Interestingly, the significant positive sign of DEFICIT implies that a relative 
increase in industry trade surplus motivates industries to file more antidumping petitions. 
This result is contrary to our initial expectations and to findings from previous studies 
such as Coughlin et al. (1989), where the author report that a deterioration of industry 
trade balance significantly increases antidumping filing incidence. Instead, results may 
reflect antidumping petitioners’ strategic motivations. For example, an increasing trade 
surplus may reflect the domestic products’ advantage over their foreign counterparts. The 
shift of market demand towards domestic products will put pressure on foreign 
tk producers. As response, a common marketing strategy employed by foreign producers is 
to reduce prices. Therefore, domestic industries may file antidumping petition as a 
* precaution to secure the trade-restricting effects of antidumping investigation rather than 
to look for the final antidumping duties. In other words, antidumping petition is used 
strategically to maintain domestic industries’ competitiveness rather than to restore their 
economic well-being from injuries caused by unfair trade practice. Since the trade 
deterring effect o f antidumping investigation has been well documented in relevant 
literature (i.e. Prusa, 1992 and Staiger and Wolak, 1994), such strategic motivation 
constitutes a reasonable explanation for the observed filling pattern in our sample. In this 
regard, our finding lends support to the notion that an increase in dumping activity cannot 
fully account for the dramatic surge o f antidumping in 1980s, implicit in which is the 
abuse of antidumping law through strategic filings (Prusa and Skeath, 2001).
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Finally, “cumulation amendment” is estimated to significantly drive up the 
antidumping filing incidences, confirming the widely held belief that “cumulation 
amendment” increases the chance o f an ITC’s affirmative injury determination. Industries 
anticipate and incorporate such non-economic determinants o f the ITC’s decision into 
their filing decisions.
4.2.3 An Issue With the Steel and Steel Related Industries
Another common consideration in previous studies is the extensive use of 
antidumping law by steel and steel related industries (Blonigen and Prusa, 2001). A brief 
review of Appendix Table 4 shows that the largest annual filing number is 56, while the 
mean value is only 0.5363. Implicit in such observation is the presence of strikingly large 
antidumping petitioners in our sample, namely, the steel and steel related industries. For 
example, steel and steel related industries filed 50, 44 and 56, antidumping petitions in 
.year 1982, 1985 and 1992 respectively. Previous studies also suggest that steel industry 
has been effectively filing large number of antidumping petitions with the ITC due to its 
political power and the leaming-by-doing effect (Moore, 1992 and Sabry, 2000). 
President G.W. Bush’s recent 30 percent import tariff granted to the steel industry is 
simply another demonstration of steel industry’s political influence. Thus, it is reasonable 
for us to test whether the above results are sensitive to the inclusion of steel and steel 
related industries in our sample. In Table 3, we present the estimates for the poisson 
panel model excluding steel and steel related industries.
50
Table 3.
Poisson Estimation on Non-Steel Industries’ Filing Decision37
Variable Fixed Effect Random Effect
Constant - -2.10264**
- (0.000)
CYCLE 0.26406 0.29101
(0.391) (0.340)
CAP -0.01488** -0.01468**
(0.014) (0.011)
IMPR -0.12864 -0.00363
(0.360) (0.731)
DEFICIT 0.00003* 0.00003*
(0.080) (0.098)
SIZE -6.89E-07 3.58E-06
(0.880) (0.283)
CUMUL 0.46815** 0.34700**
(0.030) (0.0095)
Number of 
Observations
1027 1027
-Likelihood 
Ratio test b/
814.67(<//=01)
'W ald Chi2 19.66 (d f— 6) 17.56 (d f -6 )
Hausman test 0.5414 (df = 6)
Notes: a/ the numbers in parentheses are the p-values
b/ likelihood ratio test of a  = 0; the statistics follow a x 2 distribution 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level with two-tailed test.
**Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level with two-tailed test.
The results in Table 3 are quantitatively similar to those in Table 2 except for 
CYCLE. CYCLE is no longer significant at the 10 percent significance level. The 
insignificant coefficient estimate for CYCLE suggests that steel and steel related 
industries’ filing behavior is more sensitive to the business cycle than all other industries. 
Since steel and steel related industries are characterized by economies of scale, their 
profitability is more sensitive to demand due to large fixed production costs. Besides, the
steel industry is closely connected with a wide range of other economic sectors, such as 
auto industry and construction industry. Therefore, the overall poor economic 
performance of other industries during economic downturns may have additive effects on 
the steel and steel related industries, which causes them more likely than other industries 
to lobby for antidumping protection. In addition, a huge labor force enables the steel and 
steel related industries to stimulate the public protectionist sentiment more effectively in 
face of general economic deterioration, which, in turn, increase its chances of getting 
antidumping protection. Together with their exclusive political advantage, these 
characteristics give extra motivations for the steel and steel related industries to file 
antidumping petition during economic downturns. Our estimation results indicate that 
..industries are generally similar in their decisions to lobby for antidumping protection.
As mentioned previously, we intend to test whether the determinants of 
industries’ filing decisions accord well with the factors involved in the ITC’s injury 
determinations. Consistency between these two would indicate that industries anticipate 
outcomes. In the next section we apply the probit model to estimate the ITC’s decision­
making behavior, with the primary goal of estimating the effect o f macroeconomic 
pressures on the ITC’s material injury determinations.
4.3.1 Modeling the ITC Decision Making
The ITC makes the final determination for material injury investigation, based on 
specific information about the petitioning industry, such as capacity utilization, import- 
penetration ratio and changes in the volume of imports and exports, etc. If  the ITC 
concludes that these measures exceed a certain level, an affirmative determination is
granted and antidumping duties levied. Otherwise, a negative determination is obtained 
terminating the petition. In other words, the following model is estimated:
Zi = p  Xi + S i (5)
Where Z, is the unobservable decision standard that is a function of the independent
variables contained in matrix X i . The matrix X i contains the attributes of antidumping
case i. (3’s are coefficient parameters. The subscript i indicates the zth antidumping case in
our data sample. Since Z{ measures the unobservable decision standard used by the ITC,
the following model is used:
y = l  if  2 i > 0
y = °  if Zi —0 (6)
The ITC makes a binary choice of whether or not to grant protection to the petitioners. 
Such scenario fits well into a simple probit model. Y. measures the ITC’s final decision
on the material injury investigation, with value 1 assigned to “affirmative determination” 
and 0 assigned to “negative determination”. We can interpret equation (6) as an estimate 
of the conditional probability that ITC will grant an affirmative decision, given the 
attributes of a specific antidumping Case i.
The matrix X i contains exogenous variables that affect ITC’s decision:
X { = [CYCLE i CAP/, IMPR/, DEFICIT „ SIZE „ CUMUL,, JAPAN /, DEVG /,
CAP/*CYCLE /, IMPR /*CYCLE „ DEFICIT, *CYCLE „ SIZE, *CYCLE,]
The economic variables are CYCLE, CAP, IMPR, and DEFICIT as defined previously. 
Also included are variables such as SIZE, a proxy for the political power o f the
53
petitioning industry; CUMUL, a year dummy for 1984 onwards selected as a control for 
the possible effect o f “mandatory cumulating” amendment enacted in 1984; a country 
dummy, JAPAN, to estimate whether imports from Japan are more likely to be subject to 
antidumping duties, and DEVG, a country dummy to distinguish developing countries 
and developed countries. s i is a well-behaved error term.
The central issue of our study is whether business cycles are important to the 
ITC’s material injury determinations. Previous studies have used GNP, the national 
unemployment rate and the national trade deficit as proxies for macroeconomic 
conditions. Our CYCLE, however, has several advantages over these measures. First, it 
captures the general economic trend, while allowing for minor fluctuations in such 
economic indicators as GNP and the trade deficit. For example, GNP varies from year to 
year as a result of changes in the natural environment, important international events or 
fluctuations in major raw material prices, such as oil. Just as a temporary decrease in 
temperature would not reverse the warming up trend in spring, a minor fluctuation in 
GNP would not vary the trend of an economic upturn or downturn. Therefore, the 
investigation of relation between CYCLE and the ITC’s injury decision provides a clearer 
picture o f whether and how the ITC responds to macroeconomic trends.
Second, the lag between policy response and change in the economic condition is 
very likely to delay the ITC’s response to general economic changes. In addition, since 
each individual commissioner can choose their own investigation criteria (Kaplan, 1991), 
they may not interpret the change in a specific economic indicator in the same way. The 
differentiated responses of individual commissioners may collectively delay the ITC’s
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response to economic shocks. The business cycle measure, however, is based on the 
behavior o f several economic indicators over time.
Thirdly, using variables such as national trade deficit to measure general 
economic pressure may even turn out to be misleading. For example, the increase in the 
trade deficit may stem from faster increase in the domestic demand relative to that in the 
production capacity of the domestic industry. In this case, the domestic industries are 
likely to operate at full capacity in a booming economy. Therefore the estimation results 
could be misleading, if the increased trade deficit is interpreted as deterioration of the 
domestic economy increasing protectionist pressure on the ITC. In sum, the use of 
business cycle avoids measurement problems and generates a more accurate estimation of 
Jh e  relationship between macroeconomic pressures and the ITC’s injury determination.
We hypothesize that the slowdown in the economy would increase trade 
protectionist pressures. If the ITC bases its estimation of material injury purely on 
statutory requirements, then macroeconomic condition should not exert any pressure on 
the ITC’s decision making procedure, hence the business cycles should have no effect on 
the ITC’s decisions. However, since the inverse relationship between macroeconomic 
condition and the ITC’s intent to grant trade protection has been widely documented in 
previous studies (Hansen and Prusa, 1996), we expect the ITC to be more likely to grant 
protection during economic downturns.
Since the ITC is directed by antidumping legislation to analyze the economic and 
financial data of each antidumping case, and to determine whether imports are causing 
material injury to the petitioning industry, we expect variables measuring the
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performance of the petitioning industry to have significant impacts on the ITC’s 
decisions. Decreases in domestic industries’ capacity utilization rates imply idled 
production facilities or reduced working hours, which hurts the domestic industries’ 
profitability given fixed production costs. Therefore, we hypothesize that the ITC is more 
likely to generate affirmative determination the lower is CAP. Increases in import 
penetration and trade deficit often result in decreased domestic production or costly 
adjustments in domestic production composition, which causes injury to domestic 
industries. IMPR and DEFICIT are then expected to have positive and negative 
coefficient respectively.
We also hypothesize that industry bias occurs in the ITC’s injury decision. In 
; other words, outcomes of the ITC’s final decision are subject to pressures from the
1 Rpetitioning industry. The size of the industry is commonly used as a proxy to measure 
the industry’s ability to exert political pressure on the ITC, and thus affect the outcome.19 
To capture the size of an industry, previous studies use “employment” and “coverage” 
(Hansen, 1990 and Moore, 1992). “Coverage” refers to the number of states in which the 
petitioning industry operates. In the present paper, we use the value of industry shipments 
to account for the size of the petitioning industry. It measures an industry’s economic 
importance in serving politician interests, which implies its political power. Therefore, 
the value of industry shipments is, in our belief, more desirable. For example, a labor­
18 According to the economic theory of regulation, interest groups can influence the 
outcome of the regulatory process by providing financial support to politicians (Stigler, 
1971).
19 Alternative measures o f an industry’s lobbying power include the industry’s budget 
spending on legal matters and its financial contribution to political campaigns.
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intensive industry with huge employment may not guarantee higher economic 
contribution than that of a capital-intensive industry with relatively smaller employment.
The literature on the impact of the industry’s size on affecting its ability to 
influence the regulators’ decision splits into two opposite branches. According to Olson 
(1965), groups that are smaller relative to any opposing group are more effective at 
organizing and taking actions. Since the potential payoff o f antidumping protection will 
spill over the petitioning industry, free rider problem could discourage firms cooperate 
effectively in large industries. A counter argument is proposed by Becker (1983), who 
argues that larger industries have substantial resources, and thus, are more powerful and 
effective at influencing bureaucratic agents. For example, large industries are more likely 
pto have substantial intellectual resources to make informative decisions on the timing of 
filings to set up the case more appealing to commissioners. Another possibility is that 
imposed antidumping duties may have effects on income distribution among domestic 
residents. Large industries are, therefore, more capable of exerting pressure on vote- 
seeking politicians who tend to cater to the interests of labor force in large industries. 
Given the above arguments, expected sign for SIZE could either be positive or negative.
CUMUL is expected to have a positive sign. According to Hansen (1997) and 
Horlick and Oliver (1989), antidumping law has been constantly revised to increase the 
domestic industries’ chances in filing successful petition. In 1974, for example, the 
definition of dumping was broadened to include sales below production cost. Ensuing 
significant changes to antidumping law was set forth in the Trade Agreement Act of 1979 
manifested continuous lobbying efforts of domestic industry to make the law more likely
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to result in duties. The use of antidumping protection exploded since amendments such as 
the approval o f “best information available” and shortened time limits on case 
investigation. The “mandatory cumulating” amendment enacted in 1984 is believed to be 
a significant step forward in making antidumping law more satisfactory to domestic 
industries. Without cumulation, imports are evaluated on country-by-country basis in the 
injury investigation. The cumulation provision, however, requires the ITC to assess the 
combined effects of imports from multiple sources, when such imports are subjected to 
antidumping investigation simultaneously. Consequently, imports covering low or 
insignificant market share are subject to antidumping duties, once the integrated effects 
are tested to be injurious. Prusa (1996) documents a 50 percent increase in antidumping 
leases filed against multiple countries after 1984. Hansen and Prusa (1996) find that the 
“cumulation provision” increased the probability o f an affirmative injury determination 
by 20 to 30 percent. Hence, we expect the ITC to be more likely to grant affirmative 
injury decision in cases filed on and after 1984.
Finally, we assume that filing antidumping cases against Japanese exporters and 
those from developing countries increase the odds of the ITC’s affirmative material 
injury decision. Japanese producers have successfully built up their market share in the 
U.S.. Increasing net imports from Japan pose great threats to many American industries,
9 0most strikingly, the auto industry. Consequently, a significant increase in the number of 
antidumping cases filed against Japanese exporters is observed as a consequence of rising 
protectionist sentiment. For example, 52 out o f 415 antidumping cases were filed against
20 * •See Figure 1 for suggestive evidence o f cross-subsidization by Japanese automakers.
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Japanese exporters during 1980-1988, making Japan the most frequently named country 
under the United States antidumping actions. This resulted in substantial trade contraction 
of Japanese export to the U.S. with an estimated loss of $7.6 billion (Prusa, 1996). 
Alternatively, antidumping could have been increasingly used as a de facto policy to 
induce FDI from Japanese industries, which promotes domestic output and employment. 
So we expect the ITC to be more protective in dealing with cases filed against Japanese 
exporters.
DEVG is expected to have a positive sign. Developing countries’ exports to the 
U.S. are often labor-intensive and constitute a leading source of U.S. trade deficit. It has 
been widely documented that antidumping legislation appear to be notably arbitrary in its 
^treatment o f imports from non-market economy, which more often than not characterize 
the markets in developing countries (Boltuck and Litan, 1991). In addition, it is often the 
case that developing countries’ market is not well directed by the price mechanism but 
rather by governmental regulations. Hence, U.S. antidumping regulation deems 
information on price and production cost provided by developing countries as not 
representative o f actual prices and costs. Therefore, a surrogate country is chosen to 
construct the fair value under the condition that the two countries, have comparable level 
of economic development. However, the difference between two countries’ production 
environment, quality control, input cost and consumption pattern are easily ignored under 
such ambiguous condition. Therefore, it created an artificial way to construct a normal 
fair value (the so called “constructed -value” method), and made it easier for the ITC to 
blame the dumped imports for any deterioration in the petitioning industry.
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The inclusion of the interaction terms allows us to estimate whether changes in 
CAP, IMPR, DEFICIT and SIZE exert the same magnitude of effects on the ITC’s final 
decision during economic upturns and downturns. In other words, the coefficient 
estimates for CAP, IMPR, DEFICT and SIZE may vary with the business cycles. For 
example, a unit increase in IMPR might have smaller adverse effect on domestic 
industries during economic upturns. Thus, for a similar increase in IMPR, a case might be 
more likely to result in an affirmative decision during economic downturns.
Descriptive statistics o f dependent variables and independent variables are 
presented in Appendix Table 5. In the next section, we report the regression results and 
the corresponding interpretations. Definition and expected signs for each of the 
-independent variables are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4. Predicted Effects of The Independent Variables — Injury Determination
Variable Name Definition Expected
Sign
Macroeconom ic 
variable
CYCLE
Industry-level 
economic variable
• Business cycle, a dummy variable 
CYCLE = 1 if  decision is made during 
economic upturns
CYCLE = 0 if  decision is made during 
economic downturns
(Peaks and troughs are tabulated as upturns and 
downturns respectively)
Negative
CAP • Industry capacity utilization ratio. Defined as 
percent o f the establishments’ maximum level 
of production capacity CAPt-i*
Negative
IMPR • Import-penetration ratio. Calculated as
import t_x 
output t_x + import t_x
Positive
DEFICIT 
Other variable
• Trade deficit o f the industry under 
investigation. Calculated as 
Value o f Exports t.i -  Value o f Imports t-i 
(in million dollars)
Negative
SIZE • The size of petitioning industry, measured by 
the value of industry shipments (in million 
dollars)
Positive/
Negative
CUMUL • Dummy variable to estimate the effect o f 1984 
“mandatory cumulating” amendment to the 
antidumping law
CUMUL = 1, for 1984 and thereafter 
CUMUL = 0, otherwise
Positive
JAPAN • Country dummy variable for Japan
JAPAN = 1, i f  the case is filed against 
Japanese industry 
JAPAN = 0, otherwise
Positive
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Variable Name Definition Expected
Sign
DEVG • Country dummy variable for developing 
countries
DEVG — 1, if the case is filed against 
developing countries 
DEVG =0, otherwise
Positive
* t: The year ITC determination is generated
4.3.2 Analysis of Regression Results
Columns two and four of Table 5 present the coefficient estimates for the probit 
model. We estimate both constrained and unconstrained models. In the unconstrained 
model, we include the interaction terms specified in matrix X t . The model without the
interaction terms is nested in the unconstrained model, by imposing constraint p9 = pio™
9 1
P n  -  P 1 2  = 0. To test the imposed constraints, we apply the likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
From Table 5, we see that the calculated likelihood ratio chi-square does not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficients of the interaction terms ( H o :  p 9 =  p i o =  P n  =  
P 1 2  = 0) at the 5 percent significance level. Therefore, in the present study, the restrictive 
model is preferred in estimating the outcomes of the ITC’s final decision.
21 The formula is G2 (Mc | Mu) = 21nL(Mu) -  21nL(Mc). Refer to Long (1997) for a 
detailed discussion.
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Table 5. Probit Estimation on The ITC’s Final Decision37
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
Variable Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
effect at the effect at the
mean mean
Constant -11.997 -3.037 1.573** 0.568
(0.2948) (0.0067)
CYCLE 12.874 3.259 -0.899** -0.325
(0.2621) (0.0121)
CAP 0.145 0.037 -0.105 -0.004
(0.2868) (0.1090)
IMPR 0.218 0.055 0.007 0.003
(0.3841) (0.2928)
DEFICIT -0.004 -0.001 0.843** 0.305E-05
(0.1452) (0.0003)
SIZE 0.486E-03 0.123E-03 0.142** 0.512E-05
(0.1148) (0.0053)
CUMUL 0.033 0.008 0.143 0.051
(0.8987) (0.5621)
JAPAN 0.418* 0.106 0.444** 0.160
(0.0518) (0.0361)
DEVG 0.251* 0.064 0.260* 0.094
(0.0759) (0.0635)
CAP*CYCLE -0.156 -0.040 -
(0.2503) - -
IMPR* CYCLE -0.212 -0.054 - -
(0.3966) - -
DEFICIT*CYCLE 0.445E-02 0.001 - -
(0.1374) - -
SIZE* CYCLE -0.471 -0.119E-03 -
(0.1259) - -
Number of obs. 421 421
Log likelihood -250.1038 -254.3703
Chi-squared 41.9752 {df= 12) 33.4422 (df=  8)
LR test 8.533b
Notes: a/ The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
b/ The critical value for x 1 (4) distribution at 5 percent significance level is 9.49.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level with two-tail test.
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level with two-tail test.
As shown in Table 5, CYCLE, SIZE and JAPAN are statistically significant at the
5 percent significance level with the expected signs. DEFICIT is statistically significant
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at the 5 percent significance level but with an unexpected positive sign. The country 
dummy, DEVG has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at 10 percent 
significance level. The other three variables, CAP, IMPR and CUMUL are not significant 
at the 10 percent significance level.
The estimation results indicate that business cycles are negatively related with the 
ITC’s likelihood of affirmative injury decision, confirming the pattern in Figure 1. It 
suggests that the ITC is more likely to give an affirmative determination during economic 
downturns, which questions ITC’s independence from macroeconomic pressures. Our 
empirical finding is to the contrary of that concluded in Takacs (1981), where the author 
claims that the ITC does not appear to respond to changes in domestic economic well- 
r being in granting trade protection. Our results, on the other hand, confirm findings of 
Leidy (1997) and Knetter and Prusa (2000).
The only industry-level economic variable estimated to be statistically significant 
in affecting the ITC’s final decision is DEFICIT. However, the estimated positive sign is 
opposite to our initial expectations, meaning industries are more likely to get 
antidumping protection from the ITC when industry exports increase relative to imports. 
Specifically, the estimated marginal effect shows that one unit increase in the trade 
surplus from the mean value increases the probability of getting the ITC’s affirmative 
decision by 0.0003 percent. One possible count implicit in such finding is the 
protectionist nature of the ITC’s practice. As indicated above, domestic industries file 
antidumping petitions strategically. The corresponding increase in the ITC’s likelihood of 
granting affirmative injury decisions suggest its vulnerability to protectionist pressures
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from the domestic industry. For example, an increase in the demand for domestic 
products indicates improved international competitiveness, which leads to production 
expansion and new job opportunities. The well-being o f domestic industries is, thus, 
economically and politically beneficial. As a response, the ITC is less likely to turndown 
the domestic petitioners and upset the trade balance. Therefore, antidumping protection 
helps the domestic industry to secure its home market while expanding foreign market 
shares. As mentioned previously, both CAP and IMP are not statistically significant at 
the 10 percent significance level. This result is consistent with Herander and Schwartz 
(1984). But it contradicts those found by Baldwin (1985), who concludes that the ITC 
make decisions based on a strict interpretation of the antidumping statute. The relative 
insignificance of these variables may reflect the great latitude that individual ITC 
commissioners have in making their own determinations. Individual commissioners’ 
interpretations of the vaguely defined “material injury” in the antidumping legislation 
may differ. According to Kaplan (1991), commissioners can choose any one (or a 
combination) o f those five analysis approaches in making their injury decisions. 
Regressions are run by individual commissioners to determine the variables that best 
explain the statutory criteria (Baldwin and Steagall, 1994). The observed discretion in the 
ITC’s decision making procedures may also account for the importance of the non­
economic variables in affecting its final injury determinations.
All the non-economic variables, except for CUMUL, appear to be significant 
factors in explaining the outcomes of the ITC’s final decision. The insignificance of 
CUMUL gives little support to Hansen and Prusa’s (1996) conclusion that the
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“cumulation provision” increased the probability of an affirmative injury determination. 
The significant estimate of the positive coefficient for SIZE indicates that the ITC is 
vulnerable to political pressures from petitioning industries, challenging the impartialness 
of the ITC’s practice set forth in the antidumping legislation. Specifically, we found that 
a unit increase in the petitioning industry’s size from the sample mean increases the 
probability of getting protection from the ITC by 0.0005 percent. It is in accord with the 
notion that the larger industry is more powerful in lobbying for trade protection, 
supporting Becker’s (1983) theory. Such result is in consistent with Hansen (1990) and 
Hansen and Prusa (1997) and Baldwin and Steagall (1994), where the authors challenge 
the apolitical nature of the ITC. The primary metal products industry, for example, is 
important to the national interest and has been the largest petitioner of antidumping cases. 
It has a SIZE of 32,317.909 (value o f industrial shipments measured in million dollars) 
compared with our sample mean at 21,055.645. Consistently, their successful filing rate 
of antidumping petition is over 70 percent compared with 65 percent for all sampled 
cases. Thus, our results give further empirical support to the conclusion that industries 
with greater political power are more likely to get antidumping protection from the ITC.
In addition, country-bias is estimated to play an important role in the ITC’s final 
determination. Our results indicate that petitions filed against Japanese exporters or 
against those in developing counties are more likely to be successful. Specifically, 75.81 
percent of the cases filed against Japanese exporters are successful, with 68.72 percent 
for the cases filed against developing country exporters, while the successful rate of our 
entire sample is 65.56 percent.
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Taken together, our results suggest that the ITC is vulnerable to both general 
economic pressures and industry specific pressures. Cases filed against Japanese or 
developing country exporters stand strikingly better chance of getting antidumping 
protection. The insignificant interactive terms suggest that the effects of estimated 
independent variables on ITC’s final injury decisions do not differ significantly over 
business cycles.
4.3.3. An Issue with Steel and Steel Related Industries
Empirical studies have consistently documented the privilege of steel and steel 
related industries in getting antidumping protection. Moore (1992) and Sabry (2000) 
attribute part of these industries’ success to the leaming-by-doing effect. Blonigen and 
:v Prusa (2001) find that steel cases are about 30 percent more likely to win than non-steel 
cases, controlling for industry size, changes in profit and changes in trade volume, etc. 
Therefore, there is reason for us to estimate whether the inclusion of steel and steel 
related cases would affect our conclusion on the determinants of the ITC’s injury 
decision.
Dropping steel and steel related cases, we apply the same probit model to estimate 
the ITC’s injury determinations over non-steel antidumping cases. Regression results are 
reported in Table 6.
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Table 6. Probit Estimation on The ITC’s Final Decision—non-steel cases
Variable Coefficient Marginal effect at the 
mean
Constant 1.748** 0.633
(0.0264)
CYCLE -1.073** -0.389
(0.0105)
CAP -0.150 -0.005
(0.1066)
IMPR -0.1011 -0.004
(0.3476)
DEFICIT 0.980** 0.355E-04
(0.0135)
SIZE 0.718E-05 0.260E-05
(0.2801)
CUMUL 0.702** 0.254
(0.0407)
JAPAN 0.764** 0.277
(0.0055)
DEVG 0.422* 0.153
(0.0554)
Number of observations 204
Log likelihood function -114.3345
Chi-squared 37.41519 ( # =  8)
Notes: a/ The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level with two-tail test. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level with two-tail test.
As indicated in Table 6, CYCLE remains negatively related with the ITC’s 
likelihood of making affirmative injury determination at the 5 percent significance level. 
Also, the ITC is more likely to grant antidumping protection when the industrial trade 
deficit is smaller, and when the cases are filed against Japan or developing countries. 
Industry size effect become insignificant in the non-steel cases, while the positive 
“cumulation” effect become significant at 5 percent significance level. Note that 
increases in estimated marginal effects of JAPAN, DEVG and CUMUL accord well with 
the empirical findings in Blonigen and Prusa (2001), where the authors conclude that the
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apparent bias against certain trading partners questioned the apolitical nature of the ITC’s 
practice. Likewise, Hansen and Prusa (1996, 1997) find that antidumping protection is 
constantly biased toward cases against non-market economies. The change in the 
significance level of CUMUL indicates that since steel and steel related industry’s 
petition has already been systematically favored by the ITC anyway, amendment to the 
antidumping law does not have apparent effects on the outcomes of steel and steel related 
cases. The significantly positive effect of CUMUL in the non-steel cases, however, 
suggests that the “mandatory cumulation” amendment in 1984 dramatically raised the 
probability of affirmative injury decisions. Antidumping law, as concluded in previous 
studies, has evolved as a protectionist tool. In the next section, we summarize our 
findings and suggest possible expansions.
5. Conclusions and Policy implications
Using panel poisson regression we have tested the determinants o f U.S. 
industries’ antidumping filing decisions. Our results suggest a countercyclical 
antidumping filing pattern. However, such countercyclical nature disappears when we 
restrict our sample to non-steel industries. We believe the reason is that steel and steel 
related industries’ well-being is more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, hence their 
filing behavior is more likely to vary with business cycles. The results for other 
independent variables are consistent with or without steel related cases. Industries are 
more likely to lobby for antidumping protection in face o f lower capacity utilization ratio
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and smaller trade deficit. The passage of “cumulation amendment” in 1984 significantly 
stimulated antidumping petitions in the U.S..
As for the determinants of the ITC’s material injury decision, our estimation 
results from the probit model indicate that the ITC’s decisions are not strictly based on 
the examination of case-specific economic variables. Instead, the ITC’s injury 
determinations are subject to general economic and industries’ lobbying pressures. 
Specifically, the ITC is more likely to grant antidumping protection during economic 
downturns, while case-specific variables, such as CAP and IMPR, do not appear to be 
significant in the ITC’s determinations. In contrast, variables such as SIZE and country 
dummies perform strikingly well. Larger industries are more likely to file successful 
‘antidumping petitions. But such size effect disappears when steel and steel related cases 
are dropped. Cases against Japanese and developing country exporters stand better 
chances of getting antidumping protection. Finally, the “mandatory cumulation” 
amendment significantly raises the probability o f getting an affirmative decision in non­
steel cases. In summary, our findings cast doubt on the impartialness and apolitical nature 
of the ITC.
Taking the empirical findings together, we find that industries base their filing 
decisions not only on economic necessities but also on their anticipated chances of 
getting the ITC’s affirmative injury determination. In other words, industries’ strategic 
filing behavior plays an important role in explaining the observed antidumping filing 
pattern. Particularly, domestic industries’ filing decisions appear to be based on 
anticipated outcomes.
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Many questions however remain unanswered. For example, we have not 
estimated the effects of recent regional trade agreements such as NAFTA. In addition, 
with the primary focus on petitioning industries, there has been little study on how other 
sectors of the domestic economy react to the upsurge of antidumping protection and 
whether their reactions have effects on the petitioners filing patterns as well as the ITC’s 
decisions. Many antidumping cases involved imports that are important inputs to other 
industries. For example, antidumping duties imposed on steel products will have direct 
impact on the auto industry’s input prices. Will auto industry lobby against such trade 
protection? How does the objection affect the ITC’s determination? Will the surge in 
intra-industry trade pattern affect antidumping filing behavior? For example, it may be 
-  beneficial for the U.S. to reduce trade barriers on importing lower quality products from 
developing countries in exchange for more U.S. exports of higher quality products into 
foreign markets. These are only some of the questions that require further research. In the 
meantime, how well the antidumping policy will coexist with WTO under the trend of 
trade liberalization will definitely be on the agenda of multilateral trade negotiations.
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Table 1. Evolution of U.S. Antidumping Law
Act and Date Major Characteristics & Amendments
Sherman Act, 1890 ■ Antitrust law to regulate:
■ Conspiracy or combination
■ Restraint, monopolization, or attempt to 
monopolize interstate or foreign commerce
■ Criminal statute, strictly construed
■ Fine, imprisonment (through court action); 
triple damages
Antidumping Act, 1916 ■ Antidumping law
■ To restrain importing below actual market 
value or wholesale value
■ Intent to restrain competition or injury to a U.S 
industry
■ Criminal statute, strictly construed
■ Fine, imprisonment (through court action); 
triple damage
vAntidumping Act, 1921 ■ Antidumping law
■ To restrain importing below fair value
■ To restrain injury to a U.S. industry 
(Likelihood of injury is acceptable for complaint)
■ Administrative determination by the secretary 
of treasury rather than by court action
■ Special duty based on dumping margins, equal 
to the difference between the fair value and 
import price
Section 316, Fordney- ■ Refine both the definition of dumping and the
McCumber Tariff Act, 1922 concept of injury
■ Regulate Unfair method o f competition and 
unfair acts in importation whose tendency is to 
destroy or substantially injure
■ Tariff Commission becomes the agency that 
makes injury determination and courts are 
limited to review only questions of law
■ Additional duty to offset the act or method
Tariff Act, 1930 ■ Streamlined the collection of antidumping 
duties once the Treasury Department had 
levied on dumped goods
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Trade Act of 1974
Trade Agreements Act of 
1979
Trade and Tariff Act of 
1984
^ Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 
. 1988
The Uruguay Round 
Agreement Act of 1994
■ Amendments in the administrative 
determination o f less than fair value not only 
ensure that products are sold at the price no 
less home-market price but also assure that the 
price is not below cost
■ Implemented the Tokyo Round Agreement, 
(Antidumping Code o f the GATT included)
■ Repealed the 1921 Act
■ Amended Tariff Act of 1930 to comply with 
the new GATT code
■ Procedure to apply antidumping is revised and 
the administrative jurisdiction is switched from 
Treasury to Commerce
■ Changes in calculating fair market price, 
comparing averages in home market with the 
price in U.S. market
■ Widened the allowable products subject to 
antidumping order (i.e. parts, slightly altered 
products)
■ Allow U.S. trade representative to request that 
a foreign government take action against third- 
country dumping if  such is found to be 
injurious to the U.S. industry
■ Amended U.S. antidumping law to comply 
with revised Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
■ Amended LTFV determinations and enacted 
fully detailed international system to control 
dumping.
■ Provide guidelines to Sunset, evaluate Start-up 
costs, Anticircumvention, Standing, Dispute, 
Duty as Cost or Duty Absorption, Below-cost 
sale, Price Averaging and De Minimis Margins 
etc.
Source: U.S. Tariff Commission, 1919; Finger, 1993; Mastel, 1998
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Table 3. Number of Antidumping Cases Filed Between 1980 and 1995
2-digit SIC 1980-1987 1988-1995
20 13 5
22 7 12
23 7 6
25 2 -
26 2 9
27 2 -
28 36 58
29 1 -
30 5 13
31 19 -
32 . 2 5
33 178 128
34 33 39
35 17 58
36 18 11
37 11 8
38 - 13
39 4 7
Total 357 372
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Filing Behavior Estimation
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Filing Number 0.5363 3.0110 0 56
CYCLE 0.8402 0.2726 0.0833 1
CAP 73.4106 12.5565 24 99
IMPR 16.2769 12.6557 0.25 67
DEFICIT -821.8608 4717.3760 -53713.6 38231.2
SIZE 11015.8500 20776.3000 242.4 229565.8
CUMUL 0.7674 0.4227 0 1
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Table 5.
Descriptive Statistics Based on 421 Cases Reached the ITC’s Final Decision37
Variable Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
DECISION 0.653 0.476 0 1
CYCLE 0.931 0.254 0 1
CAP 77.943 11.229 41 97
IMPR 17.010 11.119 1 60
DEFICIT -2462.175 5070.862 -51277.1 38231.2
SIZE 21055.645 20331.0924 298.2 14635.7
CUMUL 0.900 0.300 0 1
JAPAN 0.1425 0.350 0 1
DEVG 0.499 0.501 0 1
CAP* CYCLE 72.848 22.529 0 97
IMPR* C Y CLE 16.059 11.485 0 60
DEFICIT*C Y CLE -2451.358 5039.714 -51277.1 38231.2
SIZE*CYCLE 20188.245 20499.766 0 146135.7
a/ Cases without missing variable
Correlation Coefficients
Variable CYCLE CAP IMPR DEFICIT SIZE CUMUL JAPAN DEVG
CYCLE 1.000 0.097 0.079 -0.124 0.113 0.379 -0.050 0.009
CAP 0.097 1.000 -0.002 0.050 0.167 0.265 -0.068 -0.027
IMPR 0.079 -0.002 1.000 -0.053 -0.170 0.120 -0.044 0.185
DEFICIT -0.124 0.05 ■-0.053 1.000 -0.602 -0.043 0.011 0.040
SIZE 0.113 0.167 -0.17 -0.602 1.000 0.061 0.050 -0.091
CUMUL 0.379 0.265 0.12 -0.043 0.061 1.000 -0.091 0.079
JAPAN -0.05 -0.068 -0.044 0.011 0.05 -0.091 1.000 -0.366
DEVG 0.009 -0.027 0.185 0.04 -0.091 0.079 -0.366 1.000
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Table 6. Pooled Estimation Results From Poisson, NB, and ZIP Models 37
Variable Poisson NB ZIP
Constant -0.339 -1.317* 1.320**
(0.217) (0.098) (0.000)
CYCLE -0.257 0.115 0.023
(0.189) (0.815) (0.903)
CAP -0.591E-02* -0.006 -0.005
(0.071) (0.505) (0.106)
IMPR -0.203E-03 0.007 -0.202E-03
(0.952) (0.437) (0.954)
DEFICIT -0.457E-06 -0.119E-04 0.165E-04**
(0.927) (0.699) (0.002)
SIZE 0.131E-04** 0.364E-04** 0.150E-04**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CUMUL 0.205 0.413 0.100
(0.131) (0.234) (0.447)
Notes: a/ The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level with two-tail test. 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 5% level with two-tail test.
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Y i
Y u
CYCLE 
(Count Model)
CYCLE 
(probit Model)
CAP
IMPR
DEFICIT
SIZE
JAPAN
DEVG
Data Appendix
The ITC’s final injury determination on the ith antidumping case. 
Source: 4-digit SIC level data are provided by Dr. Blonigen at 
http ://darkwing.Uoregan. edu/~bruceb/Describel.html
Annual number of antidumping cases filed by industry i in year t. 
Source: 4-digit SIC level data are provided by Dr. Blonigen at 
http://darkwing.Uoregan.edu/~bruceb/Describel.html. Authors of 
the present paper tabulate the panel data for the filing estimation.
Business Cycles. Calculated as the number of months fall into 
economic upturns within one year divided by 12. Source: The 
Business Cycle Dating Committee o f the NBER defines the 
business cycles. Available World Wide Web: (http://
www.nber.org/cycles.html)
Business Cycles. Source: The Business Cycle Dating Committee 
of the NBER defines the business cycles. Available World Wide 
Web: (http:// www.nber.org/cycles.html)
Industry capacity utilization ratio. Source: Survey of Plant 
Capacity provided by the United States Department of 
Commerce.
Percentage change in import-penetration ratio. Source: U.S. 
Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output published 
by United States Bureau of the Census.
Trade deficit of the industry under investigation. Source: U.S. 
Commodity Exports and Imports as Related to Output published 
by United States Bureau of the Census.
The size of petitioning industry measured by the value of industry 
shipments. Source: Annual Survey of Manufactures: Statistics for 
Industry Groups and Industries.
Dummy variable with value of 1 when case is filed against 
Japanese exporters and 0 otherwise. Information provided at 
http://darkwing.Uoregan.edu/~bruceb/Describel.html
Dummy variable to distinguish the developing country and the 
developed country. Source: World Investment Report 1994
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CUMUL
Data Appendix (cont.)
Dummy variable with value 1 for cases reach final ITC 
determination in and after 1984 and 0 otherwise. The date o f final 
ITC determination for each case is provided by Dr. Blonigen at 
http .//darkwing.Uoregan. edu/~bruceb/Describel .html
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